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Mr Rector-Magnifi cus, honoured guests, 
Maurice Freedman was the founding father of the modern 
anthropology of China in the 1960s. Like me, he ended up in 
Oxford, but, unlike me, he failed to return on time where he 
really belonged. 
Exactly fi fty years ago, Freedman foresaw the coming of a 
“Chinese phase in social anthropology”.1 The anthropology of 
China undoubtedly grew and developed in the decades that 
followed, but I believe that it is only now that the anthropology 
of China is ready for the qualitative leap that Freedman 
implied. However, I would contend that this has as much, or 
even more, to do with the rise of China as a global power as the 
efforts of China anthropologists. Suddenly, anthropologists, 
like other social scientists, have to come to grips with a 
society outside the western core that self-consciously and 
self-confi dently seeks a place at the centre of the global stage. 
With this, the anthropology of China almost coincidentally 
has a unique opportunity to make a lasting contribution to the 
discipline of social and cultural anthropology. 
In his 1962 lecture, Freedman spoke of the new China 
anthropology as a harbinger of an active engagement with the 
complexity of Chinese society and civilization. In the event, 
quite the opposite happened, and Freedman’s “Chinese phase” 
never materialized. Because of the impossibility of fi eldwork in 
what was then commonly referred to as “Communist China”, 
anthropologists worked almost exclusively in Taiwan, Hong 
Kong and among the ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia. The 
culture that the new China anthropologists in the 1960s and 
1970s were talking about was therefore largely an artifi cially 
constructed “China”, a narrowly defi ned slice of kinship, 
gender relations, marketing, religion and ethnicity carefully 
di ssected from complex and rapidly modernizing societies 
outside China itself. 
In the event, the start of the Chinese phase in anthropology 
had to wait until China opened its doors to fi rst-hand 
fi eldwork in 1979. In the 1990s and 2000s, fi eldwork in China 
became progressively easier to arrange, and many foreign 
anthropologists have now built up extensive contacts in their 
fi eld sites, in government and among Chinese social scientists. 
China has become a mainstream ethnographic area that 
self-respecting anthropology departments can ill afford to 
leave out. Yet, China anthropologists are only very gradually 
beginning to make an impact beyond their China colleagues, 
and it has been less than ten years that China-related articles 
feature more or less regularly in the pages of mainstream 
anthropology journals. China anthropology still shows clear 
signs of immaturity, chiefl y in a hesitation explicitly to take 
on questions of a more general rather than a China-specifi c 
nature. Ironically, this “mainstreaming” of China is much more 
pronounced in other disciplines that anthropologists routinely 
accuse of western ethnocentrism, such as economics, political 
science, or sociology. 
Much like China itself, the anthropology of China in the fi rst 
decade of the twenty-fi rst century is still caught between 
ethnographic superpower status and the continued insularity 
of a self-contained ethnographic fi eld. Yet it is unlikely that this 
situation will persist for very much longer, and there are indeed 
clear signs of a rapidly maturing mainstream status. Apart from 
the sheer number of researchers and volume of publications, 
more anthropologists from elsewhere are turning to China 
for their next project or trip, while China anthropologists 
themselves are notably bolder in exploring the implications of 
their work beyond an understanding of China itself. 
So if this century will indeed be a Chinese one, what will its 
anthropology bring?
New lines of inquiry
Traditionally, anthropology’s place in the division of labour 
between the social sciences was the study of people and places 
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not or not yet incorporated in the sweep of western modernity 
across the world. This has, of course, long since been overtaken 
by events. As Marshall Sahlins convincingly argued about 
ten years ago, anthropological work even on traditional 
cultures supposedly at the brink of extinction shows how the 
opportunities of modernization and globalization have in fact 
served to, as he puts it, “hunt money” in order to strengthen 
traditional culture.2
China anthropologists, too, have begun to turn their 
investigation to life styles, consumption patterns, mobility 
strategies, realignments of ethnic and religious affi liations, 
education, health and health care, and other aspects of China’s 
newly found modernity or, perhaps better, modernities. In 
my own research on Chinese emigration I have had ample 
opportunity to witness how the growth of transnational 
communities is shot through with aspirations to achieve 
modernity and preserve tradition at the same time. In Fujian 
province, the most important source area of recent Chinese 
immigrants in Europe and the US, for instance, international 
migration is a much more socially, culturally and politically 
embedded phenomenon than the image conjured up by the 
term “snakehead” would lead one to believe. Moreover, in 
certain villages, prior international migration as long as one 
hundred years ago can be part of a remembered tradition, a 
cultural resource that later generations draw upon to start 
afresh their own international migrations. However, I also 
found that the start and maintenance of migratory fl ows 
cannot be understood purely locally or even transnationally: 
the state, its agents, and even modern fi nancial institutions 
very actively  “hunt money” too. In one village in Fujian, 
for instance, the main reason for the sudden surge of 
international migration in the 1990s lay in the support from 
the local government. Making emigration the key to achieving 
modernity and prosperity, the county government established 
a migration guarantee fund that gave loans to potential 
migrants to help them fund their migration overseas. Money 
for the fund was provided by the county’s International 
Economic and Trade Offi ce, the Agricultural Bank, and the 
Department of Finance. Subsequently, a new policy allowed 
banks directly to fund migration rather than through a 
government fund, thus widening the scope of such practices 
and integrating migration even further into the local economy.
This example shows that anthropologists no longer limit 
themselves to traditional (or rather non-modern) cultures. 
Yet an important legacy remains in that anthropologists are 
uniquely sensitive to the problematic, local and often tentative 
nature of modernization. To anthropologists, modernity is 
anything but self-evident, monolithic, inevitable, or indeed 
antithetical to tradition, and this is something that we take 
with us in our research of even the most ostentatiously modern 
institutions or phenomena. 
Genealogies, modernity and localization of the state
When studying the production of written genealogies in rural 
China in 1999 and 2000, I found that the nation and the state 
inscribe on these genealogies their own narratives of China’s 
national unity and modernity.3 Both the practical work of 
compiling genealogies and the content of the fi nished product 
incorporate the life of each individual Chinese in a larger 
historical narrative of migrating ancestors and proliferating 
branches, a narrative that in turn is fi rmly embedded in the 
much larger master narrative of a unifying Chinese history 
that speaks of inexorable expansion through migration and 
conquest. In other words, genealogies always represent local 
roots in the language of origins elsewhere. I argue that this 
Chinese “genealogical mentality” has profound implications 
for our understanding of the tension between unities and 
diversities in Chinese culture, society and politics. By reading 
the past into the present and the present into the past, the 
genealogical mentality provides the fl exibility simultaneously 
to separate and unite. In order properly to belong somewhere, 
Chinese fi rst have to affi rm the fact that, ultimately, they are 
from somewhere else. 
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After many years the Chinese party-state may fi nally be 
relearning this lesson. Under the Nationalists and later 
the Communists, the state penetrated society to a degree 
unparalleled during the Empire. The new, modern pattern of 
rule summarized under the twin captions of state building and 
nationalism leaves insuffi cient room to enmesh the state with 
society, and culture and religion with politics, as the Empire 
had done so effectively. Enlisting the genealogical mentality 
helps soften the grip of the central state. It also adds a further 
instrument to the repertoire of containing the political 
implications of market reform that now chiefl y relies on 
setting up local elections for village leaders, strengthening the 
cadre system, and the recruitment of successful entrepreneurs 
directly into the party. The proliferation of genealogies and 
local descent groups can be a powerful tool for the localization 
of the state, contributing rather than running counter to 
the strengthening of a vertically integrated state apparatus. 
Contrary to the collective period when we could argue over 
the exact “reach” of the state, state control is becoming more 
and more diffuse, graded and a matter of give and take. Local 
offi cials, or cadres as they are known in China, are the agents of 
such a symbiosis that inserts local interests and preoccupations 
into the state apparatus, while simultaneously promoting the 
state’s grip over of these interests. In this regard, it may be 
argued that local cadres again begin to look like the famous 
gentry under the Empire, something that may have profound 
implications for the continuation of Communist Party rule. 
The Chinese bureaucracy as a framework
In subsequent research on Communist Party schools I have 
developed these ideas further, specifi cally returning to the 
issue of the nature and implications of the localism of party 
and state offi cials.4 To leading cadres in a particular area or 
organization, the local committee of the Communist Party is 
not only the concrete manifestation of the party and its power 
to discipline, reward and punish, but also the focal point of a 
local community of cadres. Cadres are recruited from among 
the best and brightest in an area, and for them, serving the 
party includes service to their native place. Furthermore, 
serving the party means working and often living together 
with other cadres of equal rank and from the same place. From 
the perspective of cadres, the party and its administration are 
not faceless institutions, but a community of peers of equal 
rank serving in the same jurisdiction. Yet this community 
and jurisdiction are at the same time embedded in a larger 
jurisdiction one bureaucratic level higher: townships are part 
of a county, counties are part of a prefecture, and prefectures 
are part of a province. Ambitious local cadres hope and expect 
that, one day, they will be promoted, leaving their local area 
and its community of cadres to become a member of that 
larger jurisdiction and community. Because a cadre’s original 
area is a part of, and hierarchically subordinated to, this new 
jurisdiction, cadres who are promoted in a sense never really 
leave their native area, but simply see the area they belong 
to expand fi rst to include a county, then a prefecture and 
ultimately a whole province. 
At a practical level, the Chinese bureaucracy is therefore less 
a simple hierarchical organizational framework than a set of 
hierarchically overlapping communities. With the connection 
between areas and hierarchy the party’s orchestration of cadre 
careers achieves a powerful fusion of habitual particularist 
localism and universalist loyalty to the national party and state 
organization. 
During my fi eldwork at local party schools in Yunnan I was 
in an excellent position to observe this process in action. 
Cadres who are trained or educated at a party school are all 
drawn from the jurisdiction that the school belongs to. To 
these cadres, their stay at the party school helps them not 
only to strengthen and broaden personal connections with 
cadres from their own locality, but also to get to know cadres 
from other areas within the school’s jurisdiction. Staying at 
the school helps cadres build a broad range of informal ties 
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that are both the lubricant and glue of the administration. 
Crucially, these ties are not only with the community in their 
area of origin, but also with the much larger community one 
tier up in the hierarchy. 
It is in this respect that party schools make perhaps their 
greatest contribution to the party’s rule. Training at a party 
school helps cadres not only in their current job, but, if and 
when they get promoted, also in their future one, reinforcing 
and creating the hierarchically nested administrative 
communities of cadres that are the backbone of the Chinese 
administrative system. Translating formal vertical and 
horizontal administrative lines of command into human 
relationships, such relationships reproduce the delicate balance 
between localism and centralism that has been a long-time 
characteristic of the Chinese party-state. Many times cadre 
localism has proved to be a stumbling block for ambitious 
central initiatives. However, the local roots of cadres equally 
often have helped the party-state survive in times of upheaval, 
if not near-anarchy at the centre.
Anthropology is a discipline that always questions the divide 
between tradition and modernity and is therefore uniquely 
equipped to understand this. However, this is not the same 
as saying that anthropology does or should always seek the 
point of view of people at the margins, in the localities, or 
who otherwise are looking from the outside in. In studying 
the life of the Chinese state, anthropology has important 
contributions to make, not only to China studies, but also 
potentially to comparative politics and political history. André 
Gerrits and I are currently preparing a comparative project on 
the futures of authoritarian rule in Russia and China. There 
is little point, we think, in trying to predict how and when a 
dictatorship will become a democracy, for example because 
of the growth of a capitalist market economy or the rise of 
the middle classes. There is also little sense in pointing out 
“sprouts” of democratic politics in the growth of civil society, 
formal elections, or the increased autonomy of parliaments. 
These messages might be reassuring to those that think that 
democracy is the only acceptable way of political life, but they 
tell us little about what is happening in a country like China. 
In contemporary China, neither the word dictatorship nor 
the wish for democratic transition capture what is going on. 
Instead, state-strengthening and an obsession with social 
stability have lead to a focus on what the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) calls “social management”. This means that the 
state believes that it can and must build a new Chinese society 
that is prosperous and harmonious. The surgical application 
of force is an important but only relatively minor, tool to do 
so. The rule of law, strengthening of local communities and the 
non-state public sector, social security and fairness have been 
fi rmly co-opted into a statist corporatist strategy to deal with 
the requirements of a rapidly developing capitalist economy 
and society. The question that we therefore really should ask 
is whether the CCP will indeed manage fully to shape Chinese 
society according to its bland blueprint of a happy and docile 
society.
To understand this, quick and easy theorizing on democratic 
transition will have to be replaced by meticulous research on 
the nature of everyday politics and administration of such 
stubbornly authoritarian countries. Authoritarian regimes have 
continued to evolve, modernize and diversify, deploying a wide 
range of governmental techniques, some of which have been 
borrowed from western democracies, while others are home-
grown. Anthropological fi eldwork that looks at the state as 
society will help us understand how and why these techniques 
have helped authoritarian rule to survive.
Chinese globalization 
China’s contribution to anthropology can, and in my 
view, should be much more than a way of looking at the 
state. Twenty years ago, Michael Herzfeld argued that 
the Mediterranean sat uneasily within the discipline of 
anthropology, because its history and location straddled the 
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western-modern and non-western-traditional divide.5 I would 
argue that currently China brings the problematic nature of 
this divide out in even sharper relief and not only because 
of the unique pace and impact of its modernization. Equally 
important, in China modernization is not seen as simply 
“catching up”, but fi rst and foremost as a recovery of China’s 
rightful 18th century place as the richest and most civilized 
place in the world. 
China, like the Mediterranean, until recently presented 
an ambiguous image to the anthropological gaze: a great 
civilization and centre of the world, yet poor, downtrodden 
and, under the Communist Party, hermetically isolated. China 
therefore for a long time remained strangely irrelevant to 
mainstream anthropology. In the Mediterranean this issue 
seems to be “resolved”, so to speak, by the split between an 
increasingly European North and an African and Middle 
Eastern South. China’s rise, however, presents us with a 
revitalized global centre and an energetically competing 
modernity. With that, it also promises to bring a fundamentally 
new set of issues to anthropology. 
After the rise of Japan in the previous century, China is the 
fi rst country that is making the transition from simply a part 
of the non-western periphery of the world system to being 
a superpower and core of its own regional and increasingly 
global system of political, strategic, economic, religious and 
cultural dominance. For anthropologists this means that 
they will have to fi nd ways of thinking and writing about 
a society that is much more than just another culture. As a 
global power, China not only self-consciously draws upon its 
remembered civilization to realize the wish to be in charge 
of its own version of modernity independently from western 
civilizers. China also does not hesitate to become a civilizer 
in its own right, imposing its modernity upon others. With 
it, anthropologists of China will bear ethnographic witness to 
global processes of domination, expansion and exploitation 
from the vantage point of a newly emerging centre. 
Taking such a global view of Chinese culture has many 
implications for the anthropology of China. Most immediately 
and obviously, we can no longer afford to talk about issues and 
places just in China. Ethnography on things Chinese have, as 
Arjun Appadurai put it, to “deterritorialize” itself by following 
the footsteps of the culture that it studies and investigating the 
impact of Chinese people, power and culture across the globe.6 
Several elements can be identifi ed in developing such an 
approach. The new China anthropology should also unmask 
the constructed nature of the entity called China, identifying 
how “China” or parts thereof are differentially constructed in 
a variety of arenas and circumstances across the globe. The 
challenge is to understand China as part of and interwoven 
with, yet at the same time separate from other areas and a 
world system still dominated by the West. 
This process of what I have called “Chinese globalization” 
includes much more than just the transnational fl ows of 
goods, money, ideas and people. Chinese institutions - the 
state, businesses, banks, voluntary associations, religious 
organizations, criminal gangs and so on - are nowadays deeply 
interwoven with the world beyond China in ways that were 
unimaginable only a few years ago. In other words, the new 
China anthropology as a driving force in the anthropology 
of the 21st century should pack its punch by setting out to 
do exactly the opposite of what the (re)inventors of the fi eld 
did fi fty years ago. Where our predecessors tried to distil the 
essence of unspoiled Chinese culture from rural Taiwan and 
Hong Kong, we must now focus on what Ulf Hannerz has 
called global and local creolization processes in which Chinese 
culture is rapidly becoming one of the dominant ingredients.
There are many ways that this can be done. Recent 
ethnographic work on transnational Chinese religious 
organizations, the extraterritoriality of Chinese investment 
zones, the localization and marketing of Chinese manufactured 
goods, Chinese traditional medical practitioners, or 
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employment practices in Chinese-invested fi rms are examples 
of this kind of work, looking at China as it is constructed 
beyond China’s geographical borders. 
In my own work, one example has been the 
internationalization of Communist Party cadre training. 
Cadre training involves a great deal of mobility. Both students 
and teachers commonly travel far and wide to party schools, 
universities, academies and other institutions across the 
country and indeed abroad. Such travel is predicated on 
the notion that superior and more modern knowledge is 
hierarchically and spatially distributed, a hierarchy that 
explicitly also extends to the developed nations, with 
the US at its apex. The establishment of foreign training 
programmes and study tours has been much facilitated by the 
enthusiasm of international organizations and foundations, 
foreign governments and foreign universities. Funding for 
international programs mostly comes from foreign donors or 
partners, who see these programs as an opportunity to have 
an impact on the modernization of China’s administration 
and the new generation of Chinese leaders, and to establish 
invaluable personal and institutional relationships with the 
Chinese government and the Communist Party. 
The booming industry that off-site cadre training programs 
and study tours have become is predicated as much on 
the new wealth of China and the increased solvency of the 
Chinese administration, as on the cheapness of travel and 
the convenience of long-distance communications that are 
familiar drivers of globalization processes anywhere. However, 
national and international study tours and training programs 
also draw on China’s long-standing administrative culture, 
most strikingly perhaps the practice of establishing advanced 
models. During the Maoist period, models illustrated by 
example what a leader wished to achieve. Models were 
faithfully studied by visiting delegations from across the 
nation, which were supposed to emulate the famous example 
upon their return home. International and national programs 
for cadre training can thus be read as a specifi cally Chinese, 
and Maoist-Leninist, way that globalization processes play out. 
The outcome of at least this aspect of Chinese globalization 
has not been a weakening of the Chinese government, the 
Communist Party, or Communism, but a modernization of 
Leninist administration. Currently, large numbers of Chinese 
cadres routinely take part in pilgrimage-like trips across the 
nation and abroad to the sacred sites of China’s revolution, 
market reform and the world capitalist system, such as 
Jingganshan, Yan’an, Shenzhen, Shanghai, Oxford, or Harvard 
University, thereby reinforcing the message that China’s new 
administrative civilization somehow is spawned by economic 
success and exposure to the West. Most importantly, it 
reinforces the notion that modernity is unequally distributed; 
by necessity, modernity is to be found elsewhere, to be studied, 
emulated and, ultimately, surpassed.
Migration and the new proletariat
Beyond cadre training, I have researched Chinese globalization 
mainly by building on my earlier work on overseas Chinese 
communities started as a Masters student in Amsterdam in 
1981. In this work, carried out with several other colleagues 
like Xiang Biao, Pál Nyíri and Mette Thunø, I have looked at 
the growth of transnational communities, the professional 
“production” of emigrants in cities and villages across China, 
and the logic of the regulatory and technological weapons race 
between these migration professionals and their counterparts, 
professional border agencies.7 Shortly before my return to the 
Netherlands, I also investigated how in recent years Chinese 
migrants in the UK have moved beyond the traditional 
Chinese catering trade, inserting themselves in what I have 
called a “neo-proletarian” sector of the labour market where 
they work alongside other, mostly illegal immigrants from 
Asia, Latin America, Africa and Eastern Europe. Chinese 
new proletarians work often under terrible conditions in 
agriculture, construction, meat or fi sh processing, cleaning 
services, garment manufacture, or prostitution.8 Without the 
new proletariat, many goods and services in our economies 
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would be much more expensive or have to be imported 
from low wage countries such as China. These facts are 
routinely ignored in debates on immigration. The problem 
with immigration is not so much immigration itself as the 
segmentation of the labour market in Western Europe and 
North America. Our economies need the cheap labour of 
immigrants who can be hired and fi red at a moment’s notice 
completely outside the careful regulation of our welfare 
states and legal systems. The issue is not illegal residence, but 
the Dickensian exploitation of illegal labour. Without this 
acknowledgment, any debate, tweet, or policy proposal on 
the immigration problem is just an exercise in demagogy, 
hypocrisy and self-delusion.
China, a country of international in-migration
We in Europe are of course not alone in this. Many Asian 
countries as well are haunted by the spectre of the hungry 
immigrant, eager to fatten up on the new wealth of these 
nations. And despite all the fear in Europe and North America 
surrounding unfettered immigration from China, there too the 
tide seems to be turning.
Currently, I am working on a research project that brings 
together my two areas of specialization - society and 
governance in China and international migration. The project 
focuses on an entirely new fi eld of research: China as a country 
of international in-migration.9 China’s wealth and global 
prominence attract increasing numbers of foreigners who settle 
in China, sometimes for good. These immigrants not only 
include people from surrounding countries and Chinese return 
migrants, but are also from places that one perhaps would 
expect less, such as Africa, the Middle East and South Asia, and 
westerners from Europe, North America and Oceania. 
The project focuses on the mobility patterns and community 
formation of these immigrant groups and policy making 
and implementation of the Chinese state in dealing with 
this new challenge, and in this regard builds on earlier work 
anthropological work on communities of internal migrants 
pioneered by my former Ph.D. student Xiang Biao. In the short 
to medium term, the rise of China as a major immigration 
country is mostly predicated on the continued growth of its 
economy and its gradual transition to an urban, service-based 
economy. In the long term, it seems certain that because of 
China’s family planning, the impact of population ageing 
will be much more extreme in China than in the West, or 
even Japan and Korea. Economic and social development 
and demographic trends will combine to create increasing 
shortages of labour. In twenty years from now, China will be a 
country defi ned by its cities rather than by its countryside, and 
the latter will no longer be able to act as a limitless reservoir of 
labour migrants. Moreover, China’s alarmingly unbalanced sex 
ratio means that there will be many more men than women, 
creating a surge in demand for women (mainly as wives, but 
also as mistresses or prostitutes) that will fuel international 
migration and traffi cking.
China currently has an estimated foreign population of over 
two million people. With the rapid increase in the number and 
diversity of immigrants, China is beginning to be faced with 
the formation of more permanent immigrant communities, 
many of which are, like internal migrants earlier, residentially 
clustered and occupationally specialized. This will have 
considerable repercussions for the kind of country that China 
will be in ten or twenty years from now. Foreigners generate 
specifi c demands for housing, education, health care and 
other aspects of infrastructure that can no longer be ignored 
in an analysis of China’s increasingly cosmopolitan urban 
forms. Immigrants also have a direct impact on China’s 
social, cultural and religious diversity, and the associated 
issues of inequality within and between ethnic groups, 
greater sensitivity of ethnic, religious and race relations, and 
state policy making. Immigration is also a key aspect of the 
formation of borderland societies, especially in the northern 
part of Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia, and Central Asia. 
Regionally, China has become a centre of gravity in places 
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where borders no longer divide but have created regions where 
people, cultures, groups and state power meet and interact, and 
cross-border mobility has become a crucial issue in China’s 
engagement with its neighbours. 
This project is about the profound implications that this 
development is beginning to have for contemporary China, 
both as a culture and as a nation, polity and society. As China’s 
policies for migrant communities mature, how long will it take 
before the old overseas Chinese and national minority policies 
also come across as out of touch with reality? Will China, as 
a new global centre, be able to resist the easy temptations of 
imagined autochtonous homogeneity, immigration-phobia 
and aggressive nationalism? Will we eventually see the 
emergence of a general set of policies aimed at pluralism in 
the context of rapid mobility and social change that includes 
overseas Chinese, new returned Chinese emigrants, indigenous 
minorities, internal migrant communities and international 
migrant communities? 
China anthropology not only follows the globalization of China 
abroad, but is also attuned to the globalization of China from 
within. Immigration, arguably more than any other aspect of 
the emergence of China as East Asia’s leading metropolitan 
area, forces us to acknowledge that Chinese society and culture 
are no longer just Chinese. Urban areas with tens of million 
inhabitants like Guangzhou-Shenzhen and Shanghai-Suzhou-
Hangzhou forge a new, creolized China from the mobility and 
interaction of a plethora of Han Chinese groups, indigenous 
minorities and foreign visitors and residents. A focus on 
migration will also encourage the renewed integration of 
China anthropology into East Asian and Southeast Asian 
anthropologies that remains still largely unexplored. The new 
life-styles and consumer patterns in China’s cities have much 
in common with cities in South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Hong 
Kong and Southeast Asia. Unlike twenty years ago, therefore, 
anthropologists can no longer study China as if it has nothing 
to do with the region that it is part of. 
Continuities and transformations in China anthropology
China anthropology will continue to be fi rmly grounded 
in ethnography in China itself, yet at the same time will 
increasingly venture beyond its borders. Explicitly teasing out 
the continuities and transformations of civilizing projects 
that take both Chinese themselves and external others as their 
object will allow anthropologists to make ethnographically 
informed comparisons with civilizing projects elsewhere 
(for instance, India, Europe, the US, the Islamic world). In 
this way, the new anthropology of China should not only 
help reinvigorate what Peter van der Veer calls an explicitly 
comparative sociology within anthropology itself10, but also 
enable anthropologists to enter larger debates about the 
rise of the world’s next superpowers. In my view, making 
ourselves heard outside the confi nes of our own discipline 
is equally as important an aspect of mainstreaming China 
anthropology as is achieving a more prominent place within 
it. The quest for the essential aspects that make Chinese 
culture fundamentally different continues to generate a ready 
demand for decontextualized and generalized treatises on 
snippets of Chinese culture. I consider it to be one of the 
major tasks of anthropology to debunk such generalizations. 
Anthropologists continue to be uniquely equipped to show 
how native systems of meaning interact with the constraints of 
the political and social environment, informing highly specifi c 
local reactions and actions in response to global processes and 
challenges. When we add to these strengths a new willingness 
to embed our analysis in long-term globalization processes and 
comparative sociology, China anthropology has good reason 
to be confi dent in its contribution to debates both within and 
outside anthropology. 
It is customary to end an inaugural lecture with a word of 
thanks, which I am most happy to do. First of all, I would like 
to express my gratitude to my wife Alka Shah and my sons 
Thomas and Michael for allowing me to work stubbornly and 
seemingly forever on an esoteric subject like the anthropology 
of China, and being away from home without good reason for 
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long stretches of time. I would also like to thank my relatives 
that they already long ago stopped making silly jokes about 
the sense and nonsense of anthropology and China studies. 
Although they are unable to be here in person today, I owe 
a deep debt to my former supervisors and mentors, Hans 
Vermeulen and Gregor Benton in Amsterdam long ago and, 
only slightly less long ago, John Gumperz and Nelson Graburn 
in Berkeley. Without their encouragement and support I would 
not have given this lecture today.
First in Leiden, after than in Oxford, and now again in Leiden, 
I have worked with many people, making many friends and, 
surprisingly, only very few enemies. I also supervised hundreds 
of students. I have learned something from all of you.
And I hope to continue to do so for many years to come.
Ik heb gezegd.
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